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I. FLAGGING AND REFLAGGING IN THE CASES BEFORE THE
INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE LAW OF THE SEA

Reflagged vessels and vessels flying flags of convenience (two
phenomena that most often coexist) are frequent features in cases
brought before the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS
or the Tribunal). Of all the cases decided by the Tribunal, only the
Southern Bluefin Tuna cases' and the MOX Plantcase had nothing to do
with this phenomenon; 2 and only the former, which concerns fishing,
somehow involves ships.
* Judge Tullio Treves is a judge of the International Tribunal for the Law of the
Sea and Professor of International Law at the Faculty of Law of the State University of
Milan.
1. "Southern Bluefin Tuna" (N.Z. v. Japan, Austl. v. Japan), 117 I.L.R. 148 (Int'l
Trib. L. Sea 1999).
2. "MOX Plant" (Ir. v. U.K.), I.T.L.O.S. Case No.10 (Dec. 3, 2001), at
http://www.itlos.org/start2_en.html.

The Saiga cases, 3 the Camouco,4 the Monte Confurco,5 the Grand
Prince,67and the Volga cases,7 however, all concern ships which had
been reflagged one or more times and ships flying a flag belonging to a
State that has modest connections with the ship. If we consider the
substantive criteria for ship registration used in the ill-fated United
Nations Convention on the Registration of Ships of February 7, 1986
(Convention), namely that the flag State or its nationals participate as
owners or in the ownership of the ship and that "a satisfactory part of the
complement consisting of officers and crew" be "nationals or domiciled
or lawfully in permanent residence" in the flag State, we see that neither
of them is satisfied in any of the above-mentioned five cases. Of course,
the reference to these criteria is broad and general. It does not mean that
the ships involved would not qualify for registration under the
Convention, according to which the two criteria are alternative rather
than cumulative and subject to exceptions. It seems, nonetheless,
interesting to consider the situation in the five cases in light of the broad
criteria of national ownership and national manning.
a) The Saiga. The flag State was (allegedly) Saint-Vincent and
the Grenadines. The owner was a company based in Cyprus
and was managed by a company in Scotland. The beneficial
owners are not known. The complement of officers, including
the Master and crew, were mostly8 Ukrainian. The ship had
previously flown the flag of Malta.
b) The Camouco. The flag State was Panama. The owner was a
company in Panama, with Spanish companies as beneficial
owners. The Master and most of the crew were of Spanish
nationality. The ship after its release was reflagged twice
before its final forfeiture by the French authorities. 9
c) The Monte Confurco. The flag State was the Seychelles. Its
owner was a company registered in the Seychelles. The
beneficial owners were presumably Spanish. The Master was
Spanish, and the crew was from various countries. 10
3. MV "SAIGA" (No. 1) (St. Vincent & the Grenadines v. Guinea), 110 I.L.R.
273 (Int'l Trib. L. Sea 1997); MN/"SAIGA" (No. 2) St. Vincent & the Grenadines v.
Guinea, 120 I.L.R. 144 (Int'l Trib. L. Sea 1999).
4. "Camouco" (Pan. v. Fr.), 125 I.L.R. 164 (Int'l Trib. L. Sea 2000).
5. "Monte Confurco" (Seychelles v. Fr.), 125 I.L.R. 220 (Int'l Trib. L. Sea 2000).
6. "Grand Prince" (Belize v. Fr.), 125 I.L.R. 273 (Int'l Trib. L. Sea 2001).
7. "Volga" (Russ. Fed'n v. Austl.) I.T.L.O.S. Case No. 11 (Dec. 23, 2002), at
http://www.itlos.org/start2_en.html.
8. M/V "SAIGA (No.2)," supra note 3, at para. 31.
9. "Camouco," supra note 4, at para. 25-6.
10. "Monte Confurco," supra note 5, at para. 27. Mr. Gallardo, Counsel for the
Seychelles, gave this description: "We have a Seychelles vessel, we have an international
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d) The GrandPrince. The flag State was (allegedly) Belize. The
owner was a company with its seat in Belize. The beneficial
owners were apparently Spanish. 1" The Master was of Spanish
The crew was composed of Spaniards and
nationality.
Chileans.
e) The Volga. The flag State was the Russian Federation. The
owner was a Russian Company. There are no satisfactory
indications as to the nationality of the beneficial owners. 12 The
Master was of Russian nationality. The chief mate, the fishing
master, and the fishing pilot were of Spanish nationality, while
the rest the crew was composed mostly of Chinese and
Indonesian nationals.
In two of these cases-the Saiga and the Grand Prince-thequestion
of the nationality of the ship was discussed thoroughly as its solution
was decisive for the disposal of the case. In the remaining three cases,
the fact that the Master and crew, as well as the beneficial owners, were
not the nationality of the flag State was considered significant.
All of these cases, with the exception of the Saiga, were "prompt
release" cases, concerning fishing for toothfish in the Southern Ocean.
It seems, therefore, useful to separately consider these four "toothfish"
prompt release cases and the two "nationality of ship cases" (although,
admittedly, the Grand Princecase belongs to both categories).
II. THE "TOOTHFISH" PROMPT RELEASE CASES
The "toothfish" prompt release cases follow a common pattern.
Fishing vessels flying various flags and most often involving Spanish
interests (as beneficial owners, masters, and/or crewmembers) engage in
long-term fishing cruises in the waters of the Southern Ocean. Their
base-port is in the southern hemisphere, very far from the fishing
grounds (Port Louis, Mauritius, and Walwis Bay, Namibia, for instance).
The wealth of fish-especially Patagonian toothfish-in the vast
expanses of the Southern Ocean, and the relatively remote chance of
crew, Spanish, Peruvians, Chileans, Mauritians, and Namibians, belonging to a mixed,
Spanish company established in the Republic of the Seychelles." Oral Proceedings,
Verbatim Records, ITLOS PV/00/5/rev.1, at 13 (Dec. 7, 2000, a.m.), available at
http://www.itlos.org/start2_en.html.
11. "Grand Prince," supra note 6, at para. 32-4.
12. "Volga," supra note 7, at para. 75 (Australia insisted to have particulars on the
subject, but to no avail).

being caught while fishing in the economic zones of France (Kerguelen
and Crozet Islands) and Australia (Heard and McDonald Islands), are the
main attraction for such expeditions. The financial stakes are considerable,
given that the value of a full cargo of Patagonian toothfish can equal or
exceed the very value of the fishing vessel involved. This situation
emerged in the Monte Confurco case and in the Volga case. In Monte
Confurco, the value of the vessel accepted by the Tribunal was 345,000
U.S. dollars, while the amount for which the cargo was sold was 9
million French francs (approximately 1.5 million U.S. dollars). In Volga,
the uncontested value of the vessel was 1.8 million Australian dollars,
while the amount for which the catch was sold was approximately 1.9
million Australian dollars.
These fishing cruises are considered by concerned coastal States as
prime examples of illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing (IUU),
facilitated by frequent reflagging. France underlined this aspect in its
pleadings in the Monte Confurco case. Its Agent observed:
These facts are very serious but, beyond that, we have a more serious and
broader problem of [organized,] illegal fishing that endangers the future of these
fish resources .... Illegal fishing has indeed been structured in a perfectly well
[organized] manner. There are powerful economic and financial interests
involved, attracted by considerable profits from these activities. The vessels
that carry out illegal fishing are supported by specialist lawyers, which one
always finds in this kind of business, and very often they are the first to know
about such incidents.
These vessels often change their names. They very often change their flags
and are very often the property of so-called "one ship companies." This is a
very useful formula by which to hide the identity of the true interests of the
people for whom they are working and also to prevent proper action being taken
against the people responsible. It is also a useful means by which to avoid the
high fines that are being imposed on such small companies. These vessels are
[organized] in a network. They communicate with each other, thanks to codes
such as the one that we found on the Monte Confurco. It is true that they try to
escape the surveillance of coastal states, but13 they are also ready to help each
other and are extremely efficient at doing so.

Similar remarks were made by the Agent of Australia in the Volga case:
A fundamental fact of the present case is Australia's justified concern that, upon
release, the Volga will resume its role, perhaps under a different flag, perhaps
under a different name, in the plunder of the resources of the Southern Ocean.
One can see a cycle developing that is inimical to the proper management and
conservation of the marine living resources of the Southern Ocean.

Australia's concerns are shared by other sovereign States with a
13. "Monte Confurco," supra note 5. Statement by Trinquier, Oral Proceedings,
Verbatim Records, ITLOS/PV 00/6/Rev. 1, at 5-6 (Dec. 7, 2000 p.m.), available at
http://www.itlos.org/start2_en.html.
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and management of the resources of the
stake in the conservation
14
Southern Ocean.
The coastal State parties in these cases urged the Tribunal to
take these factual aspects into consideration to support the
conclusion that severe penalties were imposable and the high
bonds imposed were reasonable. This was stated succinctly in the
New Zealand Diplomatic Note of December 6, 2002, that was

introduced in Australia's pleadings:
In New Zealand's view, the Tribunal ought to be [cognizant] of the serious and
growing problem of IUU fishing in these waters, a result of enforcement
difficulties and the very high value of the fishery. These factors mean that the
incentive for vessel owners and operators to engage in IUU fishing is
significant. Similarly, high rewards are available to vessels released from
detention upon the posting of a financial security following detention for
suspected earlier IiIJU fishing. Coastal States, and States Parties to UNCLOS
and regional fisheries management organizations, including CCAMLR
Resources), must take
(Commission for Convention of Antarctic Marine Living
15
steps to compel and encourage better [compliance].

In the same vein, Professor Crawford, counsel for Australia in the same
case, argued as follows: "The Tribunal should at all times seek to act in
aid of regionalfisheries arrangementswhich are the only way, now and
in the long term, of preserving the world's fish stocks ....The relevant
16
regional fisheries organization here is that established by CCAMLR."'
The Tribunal was not insensitive to these appeals. Its response was,
nevertheless, rather restrained. In the Camouco judgment, the point was
mentioned only in the dissenting opinions.' 7 In the Monte Confurco
judgment, the Tribunal summarized the arguments concerning the
"general context of unlawful fishing in the region" and stated: "The
Tribunal takes note of this argument."' 8 In the Volga judgment, the
Tribunal again took note of this argument and added: "The Tribunal
understands the international concerns about illegal, unregulated and
14. "Volga," supra note 7. Statement by Campbell, Oral Proceedings, Verbatim
Records, ITLOS/PV 02/ 02, at 6-7 (Dec. 12, 2002, p.m.), at http://www.itlos.org/start2
_en.html.
15. Id. Statement of Response of Australia, at 50-6, at http://www.itlos.org/start2
_en.html.
16. Id. Statement by Crawford at 21 (emphasis added).
17. "Camouco," supra note 4. See dissenting opinions of Anderson and Wolfrom
supra.
18. "Monte Confurco," supra note 5, at para. 79. Judge Anderson in his dissenting
opinion states: "This 'factual background' is relevant in balancing the respective interests
of France and the applicant."

unreported fishing and appreciates the objectives behind the measures
taken by States, including the States Parties to CCAMLR, to deal with
the problem." 19 The Tribunal did not consider it possible, however, to
go beyond such "taking note," "understanding," and "appreciating," even
when challenged not to become "an unwitting accomplice to criminal
activity., 20 The reasons were made explicit only in the most recent case.
In the Volga judgment, the Tribunal stated:
The Tribunal must, however, emphasize that, in the present proceedings, it is
called upon to assess whether the bond set by the Respondent is reasonable in
terms of article 292 of the Convention. The purpose of the procedure provided
for in article 292 of the Convention is to secure the prompt release of the vessel
and crew upon the posting of a reasonable bond, pending 2the
1 completion of the
judicial procedure before the courts of the detaining State.

The constraints of the prompt release proceedings underlie this
explanation. These constraints depend on the fact that the specific
purpose of article 292 is to obtain the release of vessels and crews
detained in violation of a narrow group of rules of the Convention,
without causing prejudice to the decision on the merits.
Reflagging and the use of flags of convenience are among the factual
elements of the "toothfish" prompt release cases, pertaining to which
some limits to the use of prompt release proceedings might emerge. In
the Grand Prince case, the Tribunal dismissed for lack of jurisdiction a
request for prompt release of a vessel arrested in circumstances similar
to those of the Camouco and the Monte Confurco. It found that the
nationality of Belize, on behalf of which the request of prompt release
had been submitted, was not established satisfactorily as the
This was possibly
documentation gave inconsistent indications.
connected to the fact that, when apprehended, the Grand Prince was on
its way to Brazil, where it had already begun to seek reflagging.
Regardless of the Tribunal's conclusions on the merits, and whatever
other reasons it may have had for those conclusions, the attention it paid
proprio motu to the question of nationality, in ascertaining its
jurisdiction, seems to be a clear indication of an intention to consider,
whenever legally possible, the "background" of prompt release cases.
With the exception of the Volga case, all of the "toothfish" prompt
release cases were submitted to the Tribunal, as permitted by article 292,
paragraph 2, "on behalf' of the flag State, and not directly by it. This
possibility was introduced in article 292 of the Law of the Sea
Convention as a compromise between those desiring to give the private

19.
20.
21.

"Volga", supra note 7, at para. 68.
Id. Crawford, Pleading for Australia, at para. 19.
Id. at para. 69.
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persons interested in the vessel locus standi in prompt release
proceedings and those who wished not to make an exception to the
principle that disputes under the Convention (apart from those
concerning the International Seabed Area) should be State-to-State
disputes. In practice, article 292 has become an expedient tool for States
that wish to avoid the responsibilities of actively protecting ships flying
their flag through prompt release proceedings in Hamburg, while at the
same time, obtaining an equivalent result as flag States through the
action of the private interested persons and consequently enhancing their
attractiveness. This has made crucial the authorization that private
persons wishing to submit to the Tribunal an application for prompt
release on behalf of a State be required to obtain consent from that State.
In its dealings with prospective applicants, the Tribunal has made it
clear that the authorization must come from members of the Government
entitled to represent the State in foreign relations, such as the Minister of
Foreign Affairs or the Attorney General. The Tribunal wishes to minimize
the risk of proceeding on the basis of an application signed by an official
who is later disowned by higher authorities or whose authority is
challenged in the proceedings.
Flag States may assess the pros and cons of authorizing prompt release
proceedings on their behalf. In such assessment, considerations based
on the policy and bilateral relations of the detaining State will be
relevant. Also, diplomatic pressure from the State that has arrested the
vessel and possibly the pressure of public opinion and non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) may play a part in the decision of the flag State.
While the diplomatic notes of France to the Seychelles, which aimed at
discouraging the latter from bringing the Monte Confurco case to the
Law of the Sea Tribunal, are on record, only rumors exist regarding
NGO pressure or diplomatic considerations explaining why certain
prompt release cases did not reach Hamburg. The desire to avoid such
pressures might be part of the explanation of the decision of the Russian
Federation, not generally known as a "flag of convenience State," to
submit directly to the Tribunal the Volga case, even though in fact its
defense in the case was mostly ensured by the lawyers of the private
company interested.
A further consequence of cases submitted "on behalf' of a flag (of
convenience) State is that the function of agent is taken by the private
lawyer representing the private interest in the ship. While the situation
of a private lawyer acting as agent of a State is not unprecedented before

the International Court of Justice, the roles of agent and counsel remain
separate, even though raising some concerns. 22 In the "on behalf'
prompt release cases, agent and counsel become one. This situation may
raise doubts as to whether the agent can always be considered as the
representative of the State party and may create difficulties when
questions requiring answers on matters of domestic law of the flag State
arise. Judge ad hoc Cot expressed his uneasiness for this situation in his
declaration to the GrandPrincejudgment:
The delegation of sovereignty by the flag State in appointing a lawyer as agent
raises a different kind of problem. The dispute before the Tribunal remains an
inter-State dispute. However, the lawyer-agent is not necessarily in close
contact with the authorities of the flag State. The credibility and reliability of
the information he provides as to the legal position of the flag State may be
questionable. In the present case, the Tribunal had to be satisfied with
incomplete and contradictory information concerning the registration 23
of the
vessel and the position of Belize as to the nationality of the GrandPrince.

III. THE "NATIONALITY OF SHIPS" CASES
The Saiga No. 2 judgment of 1999, the only judgment on the merits
of a contentious case handed out so far by the Tribunal, and the 2001
GrandPrincejudgment mentioned earlier are the two instances in which
the Tribunal considered questions concerning the nationality of ships
directly. The Saiga No. 2 case is particularly rich on this matter.
There are three aspects that require some attention. First, the
Judgment of the Tribunal decided that the Saiga had retained the
Vincentian nationality, even though the validity of its certificate of
registration had lapsed, by invoking in particular the practice of both
parties to the dispute as well as the needs of justice in the case. This
shows that the Tribunal had in mind the distinction between nationality
and proof of nationality, which makes it possible to substitute elements
indicating nationality for the missing registration.
Second, the Judgment states:
The [Convention's purpose] on the need for a genuine link between the ship and
the flag State is to secure more effective implementation of the duties of the flag
State [sic] and not to establish criteria by reference to which the validity
of the
24
registration of ships in a flag State may be challenged by other States.

22. Judge Oda, Declaration to the ICJ Order on provisional measures in the case
concerning armed activities on the territory of the Congo, Congo v. Uganda, July 1,
2000, paras. 8, 39 I.L.M., 1100, 1114-15 (2000).
23. "Grand Prince," supra note 6. Declaration of Judge ad hoc Cot, para. 14,
available at http://www.itlos.org/start2_en.html; see also Jean-Pierre Cot, Appearing
'for" or "on behalfof' a State: The Role of Private CounselBefore InternationalTribunals,
in LIBER AMICORUM JUDGE SHIGERU ODA 835 (Nisuke Ando et al. eds., 2002).
24. M/V "SAIGA " (No. 2), supra note 3.
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According to the Tribunal, this statement is supported by the evolution
of the "genuine link" provision from its formulation in the Geneva High
Seas Convention to that set out in the 1982 U.N. Convention on
Conditions for Registration of Ships, as well as by subsequent practice.
Such practice includes the inability of the 1986 U.N. Convention to enter
into force, the weakness of its substantive content, and especially the
fact that the recent Straddling Stocks Agreement of 1995 and the FAO
Compliance Agreement of 1993 "set out ...

detailed obligations to be

discharged by the flag States of fishing vessels but do not deal25with the
conditions to be satisfied for the registration of fishing vessels."
It is significant that negotiations leading to the above mentioned 1993
"Agreement to Promote Compliance with International Conservation
and Management Measures by Fishing Vessels on the High Seas" started
as concerning "the flagging of vessels fishing on the high seas to
promote compliance with internationally agreed conservation and
management measures. 26 Indeed, the shift of focus from "flagging" to
the consequences of flagging was the main cause of a dispute the
European Court of Justice decided in 1996.27 Its significance for the
concept and function of the "genuine link" did not escape the attention
of the Tribunal, even though it chose to refer to it with the rather elliptic
sentence just quoted.
Third, the Judgment provides an interesting clarification of the scope
of the nationality of ships in the perspective of nationality of claims for
the purposes of diplomatic protection. In discussing whether the flag
State could make claims for violations allegedly committed by Guinea to
the detriment of persons connected to the Saiga (crew members, ship
owners, owners of the cargo), which were not of Vincentian nationality,
the Tribunal referred to various articles of the Convention (namely 94,
106, 110, 217, and 292) to support its conclusion that
the Convention considers a ship as a unit, as regards the obligations of the flag
State with respect to the ship and the right of a flag State to seek reparation for
loss or damage caused to the ship by acts of other States and to institute
proceedings under article 292 of the Convention. Thus the ship, every thing on

25. Id. at para. 85.
26. Rome, 24 November 1993, in United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization,
International Fisheries, Instruments with Index, United Nations, New York, 1998, 41.
27. Judgment of 19 March 1996, case C-25/94 Commission of the EC v. Council
of the E.U., 1996 E.C.R. 1-1469. Cf. Tullio Treves, The European Community and the
Law of the Sea Convention: New Developments, in THE EUROPEAN UNION AS AN ACTOR
ININTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

279, 287 (Enzo Cannizzaro ed., 2002).

it, and every person involved or interested in its operations are treated as an
to the flag State. The nationalities of these persons are not
entity linked
28
relevant.

This conclusion was strengthened by referring to
two basic characteristics of modem maritime transport: the transient and
multinational composition of ships' crews and the multiplicity of interests that
may be involved in the cargo on board a single ship. A container vessel carries
a large number of containers, and the persons with interests in them may be of
many different nationalities. This may also be true in relation to cargo on board
a break-bulk carrier. Any of these ships could have a crew comprising persons
of several nationalities. If each person sustaining damage were obliged to look
for protection29from the State of which such person is a national, undue hardship
would ensue.

Commentators (and dissenting judges 30 ) have seen some inconsistency
between the approach followed in the Grand Prince judgment
concluding that the ship had lost the nationality of Belize and the
approach followed in the 1999 judgment concluding that the Saiga had
maintained the Vincentian nationality. This inconsistency may be real
or apparent. Considerations of justice in the specific case (explicitly
mentioned in the Saiga No. 2 judgment) may have been relevant, as well
as the "background" of frequent reflagging discussed earlier, which the
Tribunal has learned to recognize as a recurring feature of the
"toothfish" prompt release cases.
A further relevant aspect of the Grand Prince judgment is that the
Tribunal had to deal with the law of Belize granting its authorities the
right to cancel registration of a ship as a punitive measure for violations
of the conditions set out in the fishing license. While this was a
background element to the alleged loss of nationality of the vessel, its
wisdom is not discussed in the judgment. It did not, however, escape the
attention of judges. Judge Wolfrum on one side, and the nine dissenting
judges, on the other, stated directly opposing views. Judge Wolfrum stated:
I would like to highlight the newly introduced provision in the legislation of
Belize that permits the Belizean authorities to de-register a vessel for violations
of international conventions and agreements.
I consider this to be a
commendable approach which in an innovative manner strengthens the role of
the flag State with the view to a more effective protection of national and
international fishery resources or of the marine environment. It is for Belize to
ensure that the respective decisions are not taken in an arbitrary manner and that
the shipowners may have recourse to a procedure in which they can defend their
rights. 31

28. MV "SAIGA" (No.2), supra note 3, at para. 106.
29. Id. at para. 107.
30. "Grand Prince," supra note 6. Joint dissenting opinion of Judges Caminos,
Marotta Rangel, Yankov, Yamamoto, AkI, Vukas, Marsit, Eiriksson, and Jesus, at para. 11.
31. Id. Judge Wolfrum's Declaration, at para. 5.
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The nine dissenting Judges, however, stated:
The decision of the Tribunal has the effect, perhaps unintended, when depriving
Belize of its rights as a flag State, albeit for the limited purposes of actions
under article 292 of the Convention, [of) condoning a system under which a flag
State can in certain circumstances absolve itself of its duties as a flag State,
including those laid down in article 94 of the Convention. It will be recalled
that, under article 94, paragraph 1, every State must effectively exercise its
jurisdiction and control in administrative, technical and social matters over
ships flying its flag. It certainly cannot suffice for a flag State to seek to comply
merely by revoking, without more, the registration of ships
with this obligation
32
flying its flag.
IV. CONCLUSION

Nationality of ships remains an axis of the law of the sea. Inter-State
relations concerning activities at sea depend on it. It remains a welldefended preserve of the sovereignty of the States. Attempts at
conditioning the sovereign right to fix the conditions for the granting of
nationality to ships have not been very successful. The needs underlying
these attempts have, however, obtained the effect of making the
consequences of the granting of nationality to a ship more precise in
terms of duties and responsibilities of the flag State.

32. Id. Dissenting opinion of Judges Caminos, Marotta Rangel, Yankov,
Yamamoto, Akl, Vukas, Marsit, Eiriksson, and Jesus, at para. 16.
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